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Abstract This paper analyzes the impact of the global financial crisis on emerging
markets. It argues that the crisis will have enduring implications for policy toward
the development and liberalization of financial markets. In particular, emerging
markets will rely (even) less on external finance and adopt a less permissive
approach to foreign bank presence. In contrast, the crisis will have a much more
limited impact on other aspects of globalization. More controversially, the paper
argues that the crisis is unlikely to have a major impact on the structure of the
international monetary system.
1 Introduction
Unlike other recent financial crises, the seeds of this one were sown in the United
States. This crisis erupted in America in the summer of 2007 and the shock waves
radiated out from there. The crisis was rooted first and foremost in lax regulation and
skewed incentives in U.S. financial markets.1 But within a few months it had
engulfed the entire world. It thus has important implications for high-, medium- and
low-income countries alike.
In this paper I focus on the lessons for middle-income countries, what are
popularly called emerging markets. Given the origins of the crisis a large literature
has already developed around the lessons for the advanced countries.2 And
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1There is a view that the crisis was due principally to large capital flows into the United States, which
lowered lending standards and fueled credit market excesses, and that these large capital inflows reflected
the excess of saving over investment in Emerging Asia and the oil-exporting economies. My own view,
expressed elsewhere, is that this problem of global imbalances, while adding fuel to the fire, was not the
spark. And as for the origin of the imbalances, it takes two to tango; the inadequacy of saving relative to
investment in the United States was equally part of the story.
2My own take is Eichengreen (2009a).
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organizations from the International Monetary Fund to the United Nations and the
Overseas Development Institute have focused on the plight of the poor countries.3
The implications for middle-income countries have received less attention for
reasons that are not entirely obvious. For a time there was the belief that emerging
markets might decouple from the advanced countries and consequently that the crisis
had no first-order repercussions for them. While decoupling proved to be a mirage,
important emerging markets, starting with China, have bounced back smartly from
disruptions to their exports and growth. Again this may have created a subconscious
tendency to minimize the implications.
The lessons for the United States and the other high-income economies are clear.
They need to strengthen supervision and regulation and address agency problems in
their financial markets. They need to finish repairing their broken financial systems.
When growth resumes they will have to address their gaping budget deficits and
rising debts. For low-income countries the implications are also clear. They need to
continue investing in education, health care and other basic human services and
building the physical and organizational infrastructure needed to penetrate foreign
markets. There may be no question of the desirability of more help from outside, but
they must be prepared to do these things on their own insofar as the more slowly
growing advanced countries may now be less forthcoming with aid.
But what about emerging markets? More than the fact that the impact on their
economies has been relatively muted, there is a lack of clarity about the policy lessons.
How, in light of recent events, should emerging markets modify their terms of
engagement with global trade and finance? What are the implications for supervision
and regulation of their financial systems, given that supervision and regulation in the
high-income countries, traditionally regarded as role models in international standard
setting, have been revealed as deficient? Should monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate
policies be rethought in light of new evidence on what has and has not worked? Now
that recent events have given emerging markets more influence over reform of the
international financial architecture, for what specific changes should they push?
The crisis also reminds us that it is appropriate for pundits from “advanced”
countries to show modesty and restraint when sketching lessons for emerging
markets. But I won’t let that stop me.
2 Assumptions
Anyone seeking to draw lessonsmust immediately confront the question: are the structural
consequences of the crisis permanent or transitory?Will large capital flows resume, or will
countries have significantly greater difficulty in accessing foreign finance? Will the
financial sector no longer be a turbocharged engine of growth in the U.S., UK and other
advanced countries? Will there be a permanent rise in U.S. savings and fall in Chinese
savings, or will global imbalances return? Will countries that have held down currencies
and domestic demand in pursuit of export-led growth now modify their strategies? Will
trade grow more slowly? Will other aspects of globalization be rolled back? Or will this
too pass? Will the new normal in fact resemble the old normal?
3 See IMF (2009), Te Velde (2008) and Griffith-Jones and Ocampo (2009).
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For purposes of analysis I assume the following. The globalization of finance will
be partly rolled back, or at least capital flows will grow less rapidly. The crisis is a
reminder of the risks when the domains of financial business and of supervision and
regulation do not coincide—when banks and markets are global but regulation is
local. National oversight then creates scope for regulatory arbitrage. No one
national regulator will have the information and powers needed to avert and resolve
problems of financial instability. One can imagine a global regulator, but govern-
ments remain unwilling to cede this authority to a supranational body. And loosely
organized committees and colleges of regulators, no matter how frequently they
meet, are unlikely to constitute a fully-adequate substitute. Unable to expand the
domain of regulation beyond national borders, there will consequently be a tendency
for governments to roll back the domain of financial business to coincide with the
scope of oversight. The cross-border operations of banks and other financial
institutions will be more tightly limited. More stringent capital and liquidity
requirements for bank and nonbank financial institutions will make intermediation
more costly and cause lending, both domestic and international, to grow more
slowly. Forcing trading in derivatives into clearinghouses and onto exchanges will
limit instrument diversity and make hedging foreign exposures more costly. This is
not to imply that capital flows will evaporate, but assuming that the experience of
the crisis is not forgotten they are likely to grow more slowly. [Table 1 shows the
most recent Institute of International Finance estimates and forecast at the time of
writing.]
In contrast, the globalization of trade and production will not be rolled back. The
logic of global supply chains, production networks, and outsourcing remains
compelling. The growth of trade in parts and components in East Asia reflects
advances in transport technology—containerization—and what we have learned
Table 1 Emerging market economies: external financing (in billions of U.S. dollars)
2007 2008 2009f 2010f
Private inflows, net 1252.2 649.1 348.6 671.8
Equity investment, net 601.9 430.8 425.1 533.5
Direct investment, net 499.8 512.5 343.0 459.4
Portfolio investment, net 102.1 −81.7 82.2 74.1
Private creditors, net 650.2 218.3 −76.5 138.2
Commercial banks, net 431.4 102.7 −82.7 48.5
Nonbanks, net 218.8 115.6 6.2 89.7
Official inflows, net 42.9 55.5 63.6 43.4
IFIs 4.1 26.6 43.7 26.2
Bilateral creditors 38.8 28.9 19.9 17.2
Equity investment abroad, by residents, net −285.1 −221.9 −139.3 −226.0
Resident lending/other, net −482.6 −555.0 −118.1 −271.2
Institute of International Finance, “Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies” (3 October 2009),
www.iif.com
Lessons of the crisis for emerging markets 51
about containerization is not about to be forgotten.4 The outsourcing of call centers
and back office services to India reflects the growth of global broadband and satellite
communication, whose advantages the crisis has done nothing to diminish. To be
sure, trade requires trade credit and the crisis severely disrupted access to such
credit, for small firms in particular. But this disruption proved temporary, and credits
fully collateralized by trade deliverables are the form of capital least likely to be
diminished in availability as a result of the crisis.5
If trade grows more slowly, this will reflect protectionist pressures bequeathed by
the crisis. High unemployment fuels protectionist sentiment. Governments are loath
to see the benefits of expensive fiscal stimulus leak out to free riders in the form of
increased domestic spending on foreign goods. Similarly, now that governments
have larger stakes in domestic auto companies, they may become less committed to
the maintenance of a level playing field for foreign motor-vehicle producers. Murky
protectionism there has been. At the same time, the fact that a wide range of
countries have proceeded with fiscal stimulus diminishes the free-rider problem. The
problem of high unemployment will pass. Governments remain committed to
completing the Doha Round.
Similarly, global migration will not be rolled back. Cross-border migration has
grown rapidly in recent years, reflecting the strong growth of the global economy
but also the aforementioned advances in transportation and communication.6 (See
Table 2.) The increase in information about living standards and job opportunities in
high-income countries that has flowed to low-income regions through everything
from earlier migrants to soap operas will not now evaporate. Neither will the
transport and logistical support for future migration provided by past migration.
Demographic imbalances between parts of the high- and low-income world will
continue to provide a logic for large-scale migration. Again, the kicker is whether
tougher economic times in the high-income countries will precipitate a backlash
against foreign workers. While there is some evidence of this in Europe, it is striking
that, so far at least, the crisis has provoked little hostility toward foreign workers in
the United States.7
Neither the U.S. nor China—or for that matter any other major economy—will
abandon its tried-and-true growth model. To be sure, a situation where the United
States runs a current account deficit of 7% of GDP and absorbs 75% of the collective
current account surpluses of the rest of the world is unlikely to recur. There are a
number of reasons for thinking that the increase in household savings in the United
States will be long lasting.8 With U.S. demand growing more slowly, the Chinese
authorities will continue to boost domestic demand. The ageing of China’s
population will reinforce the trend toward lower savings rates. More U.S. and less
Chinese production of traded goods necessarily implies an adjustment in the real
4 Another illustration is advances in air freight that encourage the export of cut flowers from Latin
America or of Maine lobsters to Japan.
5 In addition, the official community has stepped in with a range of initiatives to maintain the supply of
trade credit.
6 See International Organization for Migration (2008).
7 Thus, while the crisis occupied center stage in the 2008 presidential election, the issue of undocumented
immigration largely fell off of the electorate’s radar screen.
8 See Carroll and Slacelek (2009) for a careful analysis.
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exchange rate between the two countries. But these developments are likely to be
more gradual than abrupt.
Finally, I assume that this was not the last global financial crisis that we will
experience in our lifetimes.
3 Implications for trade and financial policies
A first policy lesson is that a strategy of export-led growth entails greater risks than
appreciated previously. The point is not just that global demand is volatile; it is that trade
appears to be more elastic with respect to the cycle and more vulnerable in downturns
than thought previously. The decline of exports in emerging Asia in late 2008 and early
2009 was nothing short of catastrophic, with volumes down by as much as 40% year on
year. The consequences for GDP were dramatic. In Singapore, an extreme case, GDP fell
at an annual rate of 13% in the first quarter of 2009.9 Unbalanced growth emphasizing
exports, just like excessive dependence on foreign finance, creates vulnerabilities.
Evidently, trade as well as finance can exhibit sudden stops.
9 This according to the July 2009 revision of figures for 2009 Q1. GDP in 2009 Q1 was down 10% of
GDP in 2008 Q1.


























74.1 2.7 188.0 2.8%
By Region
Africa 9.2 12.4 3.2 19.3 10.2 1.9
Northern America 13.6 18.4 6.7 50 26.6 14.2
Latin American & Caribbean 6.2 8.3 2.8 7.5 4.0 1.3
Asia 28.5 38.4 1.7 55.6 29.6 1.4
GCC states 0.2 0.3 4.6 15.1 8.0 38.6
Europe 14.5 19.6 3.5 49.6 26.4 9.7
Oceania 2.1 2.9 13.5 6.0 3.2 16.8
By Human Development Category
Very high HDI 31.1 41.9 4.6 119.9 63.8 12.1
OECD 27.4 37.0 4.2 104.6 55.6 10.9
High HDI 10.6 14.2 3.2 23.2 12.3 3.0
Medium HDI 28.2 38.1 1.7 35.9 19.1 0.8
Low HDI 4.3 5.8 3.8 8.8 4.7 2.1
United Nations Human Development Report (2009)
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The destabilizing macroeconomic impact is even greater to the extent that a
growing share of investment in emerging markets is export linked. In China,
investment in gross fixed capital in the tradable sectors increased from 28% of total
investment in the first half of the 1990s to 36% per cent in 2003–2007. In Brazil the
comparable increase was from 19 to 56%.10 Falling export demand therefore means
falling domestic demand at the same time.11 Some shift from the excessive inward
orientation of investment in countries like Brazil was clearly desirable. The question
is whether, given what we have now learned about the volatility of export demand,
the shift has gone too far.
Determining the appropriate policy response requires first identifying the causes
of the recent collapse of trade. It could be that the collapse reflected despair about
future demand leading to an exceptional drawdown of inventories for traded goods.
With evidence now that governments are prepared to intervene to stabilize demand,
equally violent inventory corrections may be unlikely. It could be that trade was
hammered by disruptions to the supply of trade credit. To the extent that this is the
explanation, then enhancing the public provision of emergency trade finance is an
alternative to altering the composition of production and investment. Or it could be
that production fragmentation and the elaboration of global supply chains, for the
manufactured products in which emerging Asia specializes in particular, have
somehow increased the sensitivity of trade with respect to the cycle, in which case
more far-reaching policy adjustments may be called for.12
Second, the crisis serves as a reminder, if one was needed, of the risks of
excessive dependence on foreign finance. Countries with large current account
deficits and substantial external financing requirements were disproportionately hit
by the crisis as foreign investors deleveraged and capital flows dried up. Emerging
Asian and Latin American countries have managed their current accounts and
external financing requirements more carefully in light of prior experience. But the
same cannot be said of Central and Eastern Europe. (See Table 3.) With benefit of
hindsight it is hard to conceive how the Latvian authorities, to take the most glaring
example, could have permitted the country’s current account deficit to soar to some
25% of GDP. It, as well as other countries in a less extreme version of this same
position, saw domestic demand compressed violently when foreign finance for their
deficits dried up. At the time of writing, Latvian GDP is estimated to have contracted
by an astonishing 18% in 2009—this despite a rescue package jointly financed by
the IMF and EU equivalent to 34% of national income.
East Asia and Latin America may have avoided large current account deficits but
they did not avoid currency and maturity mismatches. South Korea’s problem was
essentially a maturity mismatch: banks that lent long-term to shipbuilders who had
receivables in dollars (which would accrue when the boats were floated) squared
their currency books by borrowing short, offshore, in dollars. When the crisis hit,
their short-term dollar funding dried up, setting off alarms. In Mexico and Brazil, in
contrast, the problem was essentially a currency mismatch. While on-balance sheet
10 Bank for International Settlements (2009), p.75.
11 Absent offsetting government action—see below.
12 That Latin American trade, which is more heavily in raw materials, held up better in the crisis is
consistent with the notion that recent sensitivity is somehow connected to production fragmentation and
global supply chains, but this observation still does not identify the mechanism.
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foreign currency mismatches had been reduced, corporations in both countries had
increased their off-balance sheet foreign currency exposure through derivative
positions. These corporations bet against depreciation of the local currency by
selling foreign exchange options in the offshore market and were smashed when
those currencies depreciated by more than 30% following the failure of Lehman
Brothers.13 These are arguments for why regulators should require banks to more
closely match the maturity of their assets and liabilities when operating in foreign
currency and why they should regulate firms’ positions in forward and options
markets.
The crisis also sheds new light on earlier arguments about foreign bank presence.
Contrary to worries that foreign banks would cut and run at the first sign of trouble,
foreign banks maintained support for their subsidiaries in emerging markets to a
remarkable degree.14 Cross-border lending fell by less in countries with significant
foreign bank presence than in emerging markets where foreign bank ownership was
not dominant, other things equal. If anything, domestic banks with shallower pockets
13 See Jara et al. (2009).
14 Bank for International Settlements (2009), p.83.
Table 3 Summary of balances on current account (billions of U.S. dollars)
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Advanced economies −458.9 −365.3 −533.1 −261.7 −166.2
United States −803.5 −726.6 −706.1 −369.8 −324.7
Euro areaa 41.0 34.4 −92.7 −82.1 −36.4
Japan 170.4 211.0 157.1 96.9 105.6
Other advanced economiesb 133.3 116.0 108.5 93.3 89.3
Memorandum
Newly industrialized Asian economies 90.0 103.6 76.1 98.0 96.0
Emerging and developing economies 659.7 664.5 724.6 355.6 548.1
Regional groups
Africa 52.4 31.7 32.4 −37.1 −22.3
Central & eastern Europe −87.3 −130.8 −155.2 −48.4 −62.5
Commonwealth of Independent Statesc 96.3 71.7 108.1 48.0 79.6
Developing Asia 288.0 413.8 423.9 381.5 438.6
Middle East 262.6 264.9 345.3 42.8 151.6
Western hemisphere 47.8 13.1 −29.9 −31.3 −36.8
a Reflects errors, omissions, and asymmetries in balance of payments statistics on current account, as well
as the exclusion of data for international organizations and a limited number of countries. Calculated as the
sum of the balance of individual euro area countries
b In this table, “other advanced economies” means advanced economies excluding the United States, euro
area countries, and Japan
c Georgia and Mongolia, which are not members of the Commonwealth of Independent States, are
included in this group for reasons of geography and similarities in economic structure
IMF World Economic Outlook (October 2009)
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were more likely to cut back in the crisis.15 Here is one place where Asian countries
that have been reluctant to open to foreign banks might take a cue from Central and
Eastern Europe. Of course, whether home countries will now be as permissive in
encouraging banks’ foreign operations, given the difficulties of multinational
supervision, remains to be seen.
Other positive aspects notwithstanding, foreign bank presence was also associated
with currency mismatches. In Central and Eastern Europe foreign banks were the
vehicles for extending euro- and Swiss franc-denominated corporate, home and car
loans to firms and households with incomes in local currency—something that
added to corporate and household financial distress when local currencies
depreciated. Austrian, Italian and Swiss regulators, seeing their banks with assets
and liabilities both in their own currencies, happily looked the other way. The
implication is that emerging markets, while encouraging foreign bank entry, should
at the same time strictly regulate local lending practices.
These banking-sector controversies bring us back to the argument for local bond
markets. Bond markets provide an alternative to bank intermediation. There is
evidence that countries with better developed bond markets experienced less
negative fallout from the crisis as large firms in particular retained access to
nonbank sources of finance.16 Opening those markets to foreign investors, on the
other hand, appears to have been a mixed blessing. South Korea, the East Asian
country with the largest share of its security market capitalization held by foreign
investors, also experienced the sharpest price and exchange rate corrections as those
foreign investors, forced to deleverage, desperately repatriated their funds.
Encouraging foreign investor participation is a quick way of jump-starting local
bond market activity. But recent experience suggests that quickest is not necessarily
best.
4 Implications for monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policies
The crisis also underscores the advantages of policy space. Stronger budget balances
and lower debt ratios gave emerging markets more room for countercyclical fiscal
policies. Discretionary fiscal stimulus of 2.9% of GDP in China, 2.0% in Russia and
1.5% in Mexico (all averages for 2009–10) has helped to buffer the effects of falling
export demand, an experience that stands in sharp contrast to earlier crises.17 There
has also been room for automatic stabilizers; budget deficits associated mainly with
more slowly growing tax revenues amount to some 3% of GDP in 2009 in G20
emerging markets. Again it would not have been possible to allow for this stabilizing
impact had fiscal positions not been strong on the eve of the crisis. Finally it has
been possible to expand social programs this time to help shelter society’s most
15 That said, they appear to have cut back less than in earlier crises, reflecting greater capitalization, fewer
nonperforming loans and higher profitability on the eve of the event.
16 Or at least had been able to finance their operations at longer tenors, obviating the need to go back to
the markets once conditions deteriorated. Bank for International Settlements (2009), p.84.
17 It can be argued that China is in fact doing more than this insofar as the authorities also directed the
banks to increase their lending for infrastructure and other fixed-investment projects in the first half of
2009.
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vulnerable members from the blow of the crisis as a result of the relatively strong
stance of fiscal policy going in. All this is a reminder of the value of keeping one’s
powder dry.
Economists will forever debate the merits of IMF advice to jack up interest rates
in 1997–8, but given how the interaction of foreign currency obligations with sharp
currency depreciation could cause an outright financial meltdown it is hard to see
what else the countries concerned could have done.18 In 2008–9, in contrast, lower
inflation, greater central bank credibility and less foreign currency debt facilitated
the more active use of monetary policy. Essentially all G20 emerging markets in
Asia and Latin America had room to cut policy rates. China, India, Korea and
Turkey all cut theirs by more than 2 percentage points in the 6 months from August
2008. The reduction in policy rates was even more dramatic, if starting from higher
levels, in Colombia and Brazil. Some might argue that the different response this
time reflected differences in the nature of the crisis or better economic advice. But
given how emerging markets with less policy credibility and more foreign debts
(Pakistan, Jamaica, much of Eastern Europe) were forced to raise rates, it seems
clear that the stronger position entering the crisis is the main explanation for the
different response.
This more flexible use of monetary policy has been facilitated by the shift from
exchange rate targeting to inflation targeting in Latin America and, to a lesser extent,
East Asia. During the period when external demand was strong, countries were in a
position to allow their currencies to strengthen to prevent overheating. Then could
then allow their exchange rates to adjust downward when the crisis struck and
external demand slackened.19 Currency depreciation when the economic backdrop
deteriorates is not entirely welcome—it is a symptom of the fact that all is not well—
but it helped to maintain export competitiveness at the time when exports were
needed most. Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico all allowed felt benefits from this.
Asian countries, as is their wont, were more reluctant to allow their currencies to
fluctuate, although there were sharp declines in the Korean won and Indonesian
rupiah. The existence of coherent inflation targeting regimes in all these countries
allowed exchange rates to adjust without expectations becoming unanchored. In
some cases, there was the feeling that fluctuations were excessive, leading the
authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market. This is a reminder that even
a well-developed commitment to inflation targeting does not entirely allow for
neglect of exchange rate fluctuations.
In the longer run, this episode of heightened currency volatility will undoubtedly
encourage more discussion of collective currency pegs, common currency baskets,
and regional monetary unions. These topics are hardy perennials, and recent events
will do nothing to make them go away—nor bring discussions to an early
conclusion. The more immediate policy question is how to modify the conduct of
inflation targeting. Recent events suggest that the standard inflation targeting
framework where the monetary policy instrument is adjusted in response to
deviations of expected future inflation and the output gap from their respective
targets is seriously incomplete; it has to be augmented by attaching a weight to
18 Other than slap on controls or repudiate their debts.
19 Here the counterexample of the Baltics is informative.
Lessons of the crisis for emerging markets 57
financial-stability concerns. Monetary policy makers cannot treat threats to financial
stability with benign neglect or dismiss those threats as the responsibility of the
regulators. But the question of how, exactly, to modify the conduct of monetary
policy to incorporate those macro-prudential concerns remains unanswered. Until
analysis of that question at least has more structure, central bankers will be flying by
the seat of their pants.
5 Implications for the international financial architecture
Dissatisfaction in emerging markets with prevailing international monetary and
financial arrangements is not new. Earlier instances where they were caught in the
cross-winds were met mainly by steps to bullet-proof their economies, although
there were also subsidiary efforts, mainly in Asia, to build regional supports. Insofar
as the lessons of earlier crises motivated efforts to strengthen budgets, work down
public debts, limit current account deficits and more carefully manage foreign
currency exposures, the resulting reduction in vulnerabilities and increase in policy
space have been profoundly advantageous, as documented above.
Whether the accumulation of foreign reserves, the other approach to bullet
proofing, has been equally beneficial is less obvious. The one thing it has clearly
been is expensive. In China reserves of more than $1,500 per resident are the
equivalent of 25% of per capita income. Devote those resources instead to physical
investment where they would conservatively earn a rate of return of 8%, and China
accrues the equivalent of another two percentage points of economic growth.20 Or
devote those resources to consumption, and living standards are two per cent higher.
In Korea, where reserves were the equivalent of 20% of per capita income on the eve
of the crisis, the implications are analogous. The situation is again similar in a
variety of other high-reserve countries.
The problem with the strategy, besides the fact that it is expensive, is that it is not
clear that the reserves in question can be used. When Korea’s reserves threatened to
fall below $200 billion, a very high threshold, the markets showed alarm and the
authorities were unable to access them further.21 To obtain resources with which to
replace the private-sector dollar liquidity that had dried up the Bank of Korea had to
negotiate a $30 billion swap facility with the Federal Reserve.
None of this is to deny the value of insurance, but it does point to the need for
more cost-effective ways of obtaining it. Regional reserve pooling is one possibility.
ASEAN+3 continues to elaborate the Chiang Mai Initiative, in the spring of 2009
taking another step toward its multilateralization and agreeing to the creation of a
regional surveillance unit. But there has been reluctance on the part of the
participants to activate their arrangement; if they were unwilling to do so in the
wake of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy it is hard to imagine circumstances under
20 One can argue that one should apply such calculations only to a fraction of China’s total reserves,
bringing down the sacrifice in income. On the other hand one can argue that the rate of return to physical
capital is higher than 8%.
21 $200 billion was the ballpark for the country’s external financing requirement over the next 9 months
on the assumption, hardly realistic, that none of its short-term external debt or maturing long-term external
debt was renewed (Huang 2008).
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which they will. The core problems are conditionality and repayment: countries are
reluctant to lend reserves without assurance that they will be paid back, and
repayment can be confidently expected only when loans come packaged with
conditions. But sovereigns hesitate to demand conditions of their neighbors since
doing so threatens to poison diplomatic relations.22 ASEAN+3 would address this
dilemma by outsourcing the authority to determine conditionality and disburse funds
to a board of experts independent of governments.23 So far, however, this remains a
political bridge too far. And as long as Asian governments remain reluctant to cross
it, their regional reserve pool will remain all horse and no saddle.24
In Latin America, where proto-reserve-pooling arrangements are at an even earlier
stage, Colombia and Mexico have contracted for insurance with the IMF, qualifying
for its new Short-Term Liquidity Facility. But the problem of stigma at the point of
drawing evidently remains. When Mexico needed dollars late last fall it, like Korea,
arranged a $30 billion swap with the Federal Reserve. Evidently the Fed is the true
reinsurer of last resort.25 That in times of crisis such countries are the mercy of the
United States is explanation enough for their dissatisfaction with the prevailing
architecture.
The obvious vehicle for efficient reserve pooling is the IMF. Insofar as balance-
of-payments shocks are more highly correlated within than across regions, global
reserve pooling has advantages over regional reserve pooling. And reserve pooling
was in fact one of the original rationales for creating the Fund. Thus the reluctance
of emerging markets to make freer use of the Fund is a serious inefficiency. The
question is what can be done to mitigate the stigma associated with IMF programs.
Knowing that they have more voice and influence in the institution may reassure
emerging markets: hence the case for quota reform, for restructuring the executive
board to reduce the overrepresentation of the G10, and for an open leadership
selection process that might someday produce a managing director from an
emerging-market country.
But it is not clear that incremental reforms will cause such countries to flock
back to the IMF.26 Emerging markets need to specify exactly what changes in the
structure of the institution they require in order to regard accessing its facilities as
attractive. My own suggestion is not further steps to redress the political balance—
22 And not just in Asia. The EU has outsourced the negotiation of conditionality for Eastern European
countries receiving joint assistance to the IMF.
23 See Eichengreen (2009b). Unwilling to do so, ASEAN+3 instead outsources the responsibility to the
IMF, which means in effect not outsourcing it at all.
24 European experience is revealing in this regard. So long as the decision over lending and conditionality
remained in the hands of national governments and central banks, there was a reluctance to provide
extensive support. The creditor countries took steps to limit their obligations, notably in the case of
Germany and the Emminger letter. Arguably, now that the decision to provide emergency credits has been
outsourced to an independent entity, the European Central Bank, the response to crises has been faster and
more forceful.
25 As is the ECB in Europe. Since December China has also moved to provide renminbi swap facilities for
a variety of trading partners. But since the renminbi is inconvertible, these swaps are mainly useful for
importers who would otherwise find it difficult, given foreign exchange shortages, to settle their accounts
with Chinese firms; renminbi credits cannot be easily used in other financial-market operations.
26 Especially in Asia, where turning to the IMF is seen as political poison by any self-respecting
government.
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since such steps haven’t produced results when pursued at the regional level.27
Rather, it is to remove politics from the Fund’s short-term decision making by
strengthening the independence of the management team and empowering it to make
key operational decisions. The IMF could then provide emergency liquidity quickly,
as did the Federal Reserve in November 2008, but without the sour taste of politics.
Officials from emerging markets may not like this idea, but then they are obliged to
specify what alternative reforms would render the IMF attractive for pooling their
reserves.
Finally there is what emerging markets should see as the priorities for reforming
the international monetary system in light of the crisis. Recent events have pointed
up the problems with a dollar-based reserve system. Here officials from emerging
markets have become more vocal, but they have yet to adequately specify their
objectives. Thus while both China and Russia have been campaigning for an
enhanced role for the SDR, they have also been taking steps to encourage the
expanded use of their national currencies in their countries’ own cross-border
transactions, with their immediate neighbors in particular. Absent a more coherent
message, there will not be coherent reform.
This flurry of initiatives is open to alternative interpretations.28 Mine is that
China’s long-run objective is to enhance the renminbi’s own international-currency
role, initially as a regional reserve currency and ultimately as a global reserve
currency. (Russia and Brazil have similarly made noises about enhancing the use of
their currencies in their respective parts of the world.) This is the best way of
understanding recent initiatives designed to encourage firms in China’s southern
provinces to settle more cross-border transactions in renminbi as well as the
renminbi swap arrangements that the country has negotiated with various trading
partners. Of course, making the renminbi an attractive form in which to hold reserves
will require not just that more of China’s trade be invoiced and settled in its own
currency but also that it develop deep and liquid markets in renminbi-denominated
securities and that that the currency become convertible on capital account. China
has a plan for elevating Shanghai to the status of a major international financial
center by 2020. Financial-center status similarly entailing capital-account convert-
ibility, this suggests the relevant time frame for the associated steps.
To be sure, the U.S. (and the euro area) will not have gone away. This points to
the development of a multi-currency reserve system not unlike that which prevailed
in the first era of globalization prior to 1914. With multiple countries possessing
deep and liquid financial markets open to foreign investors, there will be multiple
forms and places in which to hold reserves. In this multipolar world, not unlike the
multipolar world that existed before 1914, no single issuer will monopolize the
27 Thus, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization involved a formula for the voting shares of China,
Japan, Korea and the ASEAN countries that has not obviously made activation of that arrangement more
likely.
28 For example, the SDR initiative could simply be addressed at domestic constituencies which are not
pleased that so much of the national patrimony is invested in U.S. dollars; the SDR proposal is thus a way
for the People’s Bank of China to signal its constituents that it is aware of its fiduciary responsibility. Or it
could simply be a way for emerging markets to signal the G20 that they want to be taken seriously in
discussions of international monetary reform.
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privilege of supplying the reserve unit.29 And the fact that there will exist more than
one country with deep and liquid markets in a position to supply reserves will be a
constructive source of discipline on policy.
Where does this leave the SDR and other more radical visions for international
monetary reform—more regional monetary unions for example? China being
aware that the longer it waits the more likely its economy and currency will
dominate East Asia, is unlikely to evince much enthusiasm for pooling its monetary
sovereignty. And if China is serious about the renminbi as a reserve currency, then
surely it can’t be serious about the SDR as well. My suspicion is that talk of an
expanded role for the SDR is a way for China and other emerging market to signal
their concern that they might suffer losses on their existing dollar holdings. They
would like to see a Substitution Account-like facility through which they could
exchange some of their dollars for SDR-denominated claims on the margin.
Alternatively they would like to see the United States offer a guarantee against losses
on their existing dollar holdings. To the extent that their cooperation is needed on
other aspects of the global agenda (agreement on reduced carbon emissions, for
example), one can imagine the outlines of a bargain. But it is implausible that the
international community would agree to relieve China of the entirety of its $1
trillion-plus dollar reserve portfolio, much less that the U.S. would relieve emerging
markets as a group of their dollar reserves. And it is even more implausible that the
SDR could supplant national currencies as the main form of international reserves in
our lifetimes.30
6 Conclusion
When I am told that the crisis will mark a fundamental break in the structure and
management of the world economy, I am reminded of Hurricane Katrina. By laying
bare the extent of American inequality, and also by the inadequacy of the public-
sector response, Katrina, it was said, would mark a fundamental break in social
policy and the role of government in the United States. But it was not too long
before America slid back into its comfortable old ways. Analogously, there is now
the question of whether once the crisis passes business as usual will resume.
My suspicion, noted at the outset of the paper, is that there will be no return to
business as usual when it comes to the regulation of finance. The demand for more
stringent financial regulation will be enduring. Leverage, cross-border portfolio
investment, and transactions in complex derivative securities will be rolled back or at
least grow more slowly than in the recent past. Consequently emerging markets
(recently, limited mainly to Central and Eastern Europe) that have relied heavily on
foreign capital will have to finance more of their development at home. As the
domain of bank operations is reorganized to coincide with the domain of regulation,
emerging markets will be less able to outsource intermediation to foreign banks.
Countries like South Korea and China that sought to harness finance as a growth
29 Thus, I am pushing back against the argument that increasing returns owing to network externalities are
so strong that there is only room in the market for a single dominant international currency.
30 I develop the argument why in Eichengreen (2009c).
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engine, turning themselves into financial hubs for Northeast Asia, will have to look
to other sectors.
By comparison, the crisis will have a much more limited impact on other
dimensions of globalization. The fundamental social and technological factors
supporting the rapid globalization of production and trade in recent years remain
firmly in place. Emerging markets need to continue adapting their policies to take
advantage of this “real existing globalization.” This means making their economies
more attractive for foreign investment by streamlining bureaucracy and imparting
labor skills. It means continuing to run sound and stable monetary, fiscal and debt-
management policies in good times so that they have space to deploy those policies
in bad times.
More controversially perhaps, I have also argued that the crisis is unlikely to
occasion fundamental changes in the structure of the international monetary system—in
either exchange rate arrangements or the composition of reserves. To be sure, the
system will continue to evolve. The dollar will become less dominant in the
international monetary system for all the same reasons that the United States will
become less dominant in the international economy. But, barring even more serious
crises, this evolution will remain gradual, as has typically been the case in the past.
Thus, the policy problem for emerging markets is to deal with the international
monetary system that actually exists, not the one they imagine might exist.
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